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An earlie; paper by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) presented a theoretical analysis of the brain 
drain in the context of wage rigidity and unemployment. This paper extends the analysis by 
modifying the model to incorporate the phenomena of overqualification, internal diffusion of 
labor from urban to rural areas and imperfect information about the quality of labor. The 
welfare effect of the brain drain in the presence of these phenomena is analyzed. 
1. IutrQduc1ti0n 
The traditional, theoretic analysis of the welfare effects of the brain drain, 
initiated by Grubel and Scott (1966) and developed by Berry and Soligo (1969), 
Johnson (1967) and Kenen (1971) among others, has been based on the assump- 
tion of perfect competition, including perfect information and full wage flexi- 
bility. 
A departure from these assumptions was made in an earlier paper of ours - 
Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) - by permitting the presence of wage rigidity and 
unemployment. In the context of this model, the basic Grubel-Scott contention 
that (infinitesimal) emigration would not affect the welfare (conventionally 
defined) of those left behind was clearly not valid and a welfare loss could well 
be imposed on the nonmigrant group, In addition, the Bhagwati-Hamada 
analysis introduced th,e possibility of the ‘emula.tion effect’ whereby the migra- 
tion could raise the wage levels of tile class of migrants by virtue (or rather, vice) 
of the implied, consequent integration internationally of this class of labor: such 
a ‘distortion-augmenting’ emulation effect could accentuate then the welfare 
loss imposed on those left behind. 
*Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation for partial financial support of the 
research underlying this paper. The paper was prepared for the Bellagio Conference _‘I? The 
Brain Drain and Income Taxation, 15-19 February 1975. It is best read as a companion piece 
to the Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) paper, whose analysis it extends. 
266 K. Hamada and J. Bhagwati, ~Distortions, inforntatiol! and the brain drain 
In this paper, we utilize the same basic model, but extend it in three direction ,I 
which bring it closer to alternative facets of reality in the LDCs. 
First, we consider the phenomenon of ‘overqualification’, i.e., where job Ii 
have been upgraded and the educated are working in jobs that, objective1 
speaking, do not ‘require’ the education. ’ The extension of our analysis to th :: 
situation where overqualification is present shows that, in the absence of th 8: 
emulation effect, brain drain from the class of skills characterized by over. 
qualification can help, rather than hurt, those left behind. 
Secondly, we extend our analysis to the phenomenon that has sometimes bee:,,. 
described as the ‘internal brain drain’ but is more aptly called the ‘interns i. 
diffusion’ of professionals. Thus it is well known that doctors tend to collgregat ” 
in the urban areas and rural areas tend not to attract doctors. However, there i 
also a process of internal diffusion going on, with doctors, as the congestion ii 
the cities increases and cuts into average incomes, increasingly moving to th 
countryside partially or fully.2 This internal diffitsion process is likely to be in- 
hibited as the possibility of external brain drain from the LDC (cities) is opener 
up. We will model this phenomenon and demonstrate formally the welfare- 
reducing impact of migration in such a context. 
Thirdly, we introduce an element of imperfect information into the analysi’ 
of the brain drain. Arrow (1973) and Spence (1974) have developed a ‘screening 
theory of education. 3 In its simplified form, the theory states that education i: 
important not so much because it increases the productivity of workers a: 
because it plays the role of filtering efiicient labor from labor in general. Wt 
utilize this notion and consider the case where the brain drain serves to identify 
and thus screen, the more efficient from the less efficient. Jt turns out that if thf 
domestic labor market cannot discriminate as effectively as the internationa 
market for professionals, then the economy tends to lose, essentially- because 
emigrants are picked up from the category of the more efficient. 
This analysis of market distortions and imperfect information will demon’ 
strate that the welfare effects of the brain drain, and accordingly the nature 0” 
the policy intervention necessary, differ significantly depending on the nature o ’ 
distortion or imperfection that the LDC economy is facing; in fact, within eacJ 
LDC, different classes of professional emigrants (e.g., doctors, engineers, etc. 
may correspond to different models. While this analysis takes the domestic 
distortions as given exogenously, we raise in our concluding section the signifi 
‘For a statement of this basic model, see Bhagwati (1972) and the systematic, general 
equilibrium analysis of education in this framework in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975). Tht 
latter paper rech-istens the overqualihc;tion model as the ‘job ladder’ model. 
‘The partial movement frequently occurs through opening up clinics or offices in the neigh 
boring towns, with the city doctor spending part of thz month there. 
3A concise statement of four alternative theories of education (the Schultz-Becker ‘humar 
capital’ theory, the radical ‘socialization’ theory, the Arrow-Spence screening theory and the 
Bhagwati-Srinivasan ‘job ladder’ and fairness-in-hiring theory) is provided in Bhagwati am 
Srinivasan (1975). 
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cant possibility that migration itself could influence these distortions, accentuat- 
ing or moderating them. 
2. The basic framework and the welfare criterion 
We initially state the basic Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) m-?del, with its special 
features such as the presence of wage rigidity and unemployment.4 Consider an 
economy satisfying the small country assumption such that the relative commodi ty 
price-ratio between two tradeable commodities is fixed internationally. Let there 
be two kinds of labor: uneducated and educated. Uneducated labor can be  
transformed into educated labor at constant costs. Corresponding to the two 
goods, there are two sectors in the economy: the traditional sector that normally 
employs uneducated labor, and the developed sector that normally employs 
educated labor.5 Wages are assumed to be exogeriously given by the inter- 
national emulation T recess and possibly by the ‘leap-froggirg’ process discussed 
in the Bhagwati-Hamada (1974) paper.6 It is also assumed that unemployment 
exists in both of the sectors. 
The production function of the traditional sector is given by 
[with Fh > 0, Fi < 01, 
where L, is the emIloyment of labor in the traditional sector. The production 
function of the developed sector is given by 
F,VJ [with F,’ > 0, F,” < 01, 
where L, is the employment of labor in the developed sector. We shall assume 
that FL(L,) > Fi(L,,) for an identical amount of labor L,: = L,. 
The total labor force N is divided into two categories: uneducated labor A0 
an:1 educated labor N, y in such a way that 
No+Ne = N. (1) 
IJnder the ‘normal’ assumption that excludes the over-qualification of labor, 
( W, -Lo) and (Pie-L,) indicate, respectively, the unemployment in the tradi- 
tional sector and that in the developed sector, in the absence of brain drain. Let 
us suppose now that brain drain occurs only from educated labor. In the presence 
jOnly the barest details are provided here; the reader can consult the original Bhagwati- 
Hamada paper for a more leisurely statement of the model. 
5The use of the qualifying adverb ‘normally’ is pertinent to our analysis in the next section. 
“Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). Most of the results helow remain valid so long as the wage 
of educated labor is determined exogenously. The wage of uneducated labor may be 
determined by marginal or average productivity. 
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of brain drain equal to 2, (IV,-Z-L,) thlen indicates i.he unemployment in the 
developed sector. 
Wages are tied as i?, and Ee, and labor is employed to the point of equality 
with its marginal product, i.e., 
92) 
ExLe) = J,, (3) 
assuming the international price ratio to be normalized to unity. When CO and 
C?, are given, E, and L, will clearly be determined from eqs. (2) and (3). 
People de&de whether to educate themselves by comparing the expected wage 
rate for uneducated labor and that for educated labor. That is, in the absence of 
any constraints on the expansion of education facilities, and if educational cost 
is prcvided by the government, the equality 
will determine the amount of educated people. In certain institutional settings 
discussed below, there will then be permanent excess demand to get educated : 
in this c&se, the number of educated people will have to be limited exogenously 
by governmental fiat. 
Let us now turn to the welfare criterion to judge the welfare effect of the brain 
drain in this economy. We will take the average income of those left behind as 
the welfare cri+ion. The resulting formula for welfare change is then readily 
derived as follows. 
The GNP, Y, of the country of emigration can be expressed as 
y = f’&,)+F,(L,)--kN, = G(N-Z), (5) 
where k is the constant cost of education, noting again that the international 
commodity price-ratio is noirmalized at unity, and GNP is a function of the 
available labor force. As soon as we shift, however, to the GNP accruing to thos.: 
left behind, i.e., Yd, their income after migration becomes 
Y, = G(N--Z), 
and, before migration, it is 
Y, = G(N) -- vZ, 
where v is the average income that emigrants are ireceiving prior to the emigra- 
tion. It follows immediately then, denoting per capita income of those left behind 
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by y,,, that 
dud 1 -=- 
dZ N-Z (6) 
and, evaluated at 2 = 0, we have’ 
Therefore we must look at the value of [o+(dG/dZ)] in order to assess the 
welfare effect of the brain drain. All that this formula says is that if lthe marginal 
loss due to the reduction of labor is larger than the payment that was received by 
the marginal emigrant, then those left behind will lose; otherwise they will gain. 
We shall not repeat the comparative static analysis of the system of eqs. (l)- 
(4) that was developed in our earlier paper. a It is necessary to note, however, 
that if the brain drain results (only) in a rise in thi: wage of educated labor (thanks 





where qe is the wage elasticity of the demand for educated labor.g Having noted 
this, we now turn to the extension of the analysis to the phenomena of over- 
qualification, internal diffusion and imperfect information. 
3. The overqualification phenomenon 
The labor market may function, in response to excess supply, not by cutting 
the wage as in the usual neoclassical analysis, but rather in the contexi. of a ‘job 
ladder’ model, with sticky wages, where the excess supply then spills over from 
the ‘best’ to the ‘next-best’ job. Thus educated labor, on finding no more employ- 
ment in the educated-labor category of jobs, can be postulated as moving down 
‘This welfare criterion, as Berry and Soligo (1969) noted, is of course different from that 
which would result if we were comparing, before and after migration, the per capita incomes 
(as distinct from the per capita incomes of those left behind). For the former case, the criterion 
would modify to 
8Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, p. 33, table 2). Note merely that there is a minor difference 
between eq. (25) there and eq. (4) in this paper concerning the treatment ofZ. But this is for the 
purpose of simpler exposition and does not affect the substance of our analysis. 
9See Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, p. 33); the difference in the firs! term in the RHS comes 
from our new eq. (4), which replaces the earlier eq. (25). 
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the job ladder and taking the jobs which do not require the education. Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan (1975) further argue that, in this case, a ‘fairness-in-hiring’ 
principle may also be sociologically invoked whereby employers, faced by excess 
demand for the no-educational-requirement jobs from both educated and 
uneducated labor, prefer to hire the educated because they think it is ‘fair’ to 
reward those who have put in extra effort, as it were. Thus, although both kinds 
of labor are eqcallyproductive in the no-education-requirement jobs, the educated 
applicants are hired in preference over the uneducated ones. 
In the analysis that follows, we then modify our basic model to incorporate 
this job ladder phenomenon with overqualification (or upgrading of jobs in 
terms of hiring practice) characterizing the hiring in the sector where educated 
and uneducated labor have identical productivity. Thus, assume now (as before) 
that the educated labor may be in excess supply in its market, in the developed 
sector; however, when the expected wage in this sector is equalized with the 
wage in the iraciiriot;aZ sector, the educated labor spills over into employment in 
the traditional sector. And, given the number of jobs in the traditional sector at 
the exogenously-fixed wage therein, we assume that the incidence of unemploy- 
ment then fa1.s on uneducated labor. Formally, the model then modifies as 
follows. 
Let L,,, L,, and L,, denote respectively the educated labor employed in the 
developed sector, educated labor employed in the traditional sector, and un- 
educated labor employed in the traditional sector. Then, by definition, we have 
L,, = L,, 
and 
for’;abor employ,ment in the two sectors. Now, the assumption that everyone will 
get educated as long as the expected wage to educated labor exceeds that to 
uneducated labor (since the educational cost is borne by the government and its 
indirect tax cost not taken into account by atomistic labor), implies that in this 
modified model there would be an endless incentive to get educated: the expected 
retl:irn to educ atcd labor would always exceed the expected return to uneducated 
labor. Hence, we must impose all ex0,genLj.r constraint on how many get 
eC’ucated: i.e., N, = N, by policy decision. 
It is immec’iately obvious then that, thanks to the constancy of iGO (and hence 
of L,) and PC ., the effect of the migration is to create an identical reduction in the 
unemploymelll of uneducated labor: 
dLeO - -dZ and dL,, = dZ, 
so that we have 
dG/dZ = 0. (7) 
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The loss of educated labor is fully offset at the margin, by unemployed unedu- 
cated labor getting employed in their place in the traditional sector, without loss 
of productivity (as postulated), so that both L, and LO, the employment levels in 
both sectors, and hence the output levels in both sectors are unaffected. 1 CJ It 
follows therefore that 
> 0, (8) 
unless we introduce other complexities into the analysis. 
Such a complication, for example, is when the wage W, in the developed sector 
rises due to the emulation effect, in the presence of migration, and the accom- 
panying move towards integration of the labor market for the migrant class of 
labor. The number being educated will remain constant (at iVe) again by assump- 
tion; however, GNP will now be reduced by the induced fall in L, (as q”e rises) 
in the developed sector: 
(9) 
Yet another complication could be introduced if we were to postulate that the 
governmental educational policy is aimed at providing a constant educational 
labor force net of emigration. In this event, the emigration of educated labor 
would lead to an identical, offsetting expansion of the educated labor force, so 
that we must modify eq. (7) as follows: 
dG/dZ = -k, (10) 
because. while output in the two sectors remains constant, the cost of education 
increases as more get educated to offset the emigrated educated labor. In this case, 
again, the welfare criterion [v+(dG/dZ)] will become ambiguous unless we 
postulate (as seems reasonable) that v 3 k. 
In conclusion, it would appear that, under the conditions postulated, the over- 
qualification phenomenon tends to mitigate the welfare loss, if any, of the brain 
drain. In fact, if the brain dram is not accompanied by an induced rise in the 
wage-level in the developed sector or by an offsetting expansion of domestic 
educational facilities, the brain drain will increase (rather than decrease) the per 
capita income of those left behind in the country of emigration. 
lThir; argument presupposes, of course, that the magnitude of emigration does not exceed 
the spillover of educated labor into the traditional sector in the pre-emigration situation. 
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1. The internal diffusion process 
The diffusion of the emigrant class of professionals (e.g., doctors) from the 
urban to the rural areas, from areas of ‘low’ to areas of ‘high’ social marginal 
product, is a phenomenon that again can be modelled as an extension of our 
basic framework, leading to the conclusion that the brain drain in the presence 
of such a diffusion process could harm those left behind. 
Suppose now that there are two subsectors in the developed sector, and hence 
two opportunities for the educated labor therein: urban and rural employment. 
In the urban occupation, wage Ze, is paid and is higher than the wage k,, in the 
rural occupation; the latter, in turn, is still higher than the wage in the traditional 
sector F3,. Educated labor thus chooses between rural and urben occupations 
such that 
where L,, and .L,, indicate employment in rural and in urban occupations, 
respectively. Again, qince Ki;,, > iii0 and educational costs to individuals are nil, 
we must contend with excess demand for getting educated. Hence we will assume, 
as in the preceding section, that the size of the educated labor force N, is exo- 
genously fixed by the government, consistent with eq. (11). 
We further postulate that, in the rural occupation, there is a shortage of 
educated labor. Formally, the social marginal product in the rural occupation 
is higher than the wage, 
while, in the urban occupation, the wage is equal to its marginal product: 
If emigration occurs now, without any additional emulation-induced 
on the wages in both occupations, then the constancy of N, implies that 
and 
ti,, = -dZ, 
dG - = -F&(L,,). dZ 
effects 
Essentially, this means that the educated labor employed in the rural occupation 
decreases by the amount of the emigration: the emigration raises the expected 
wage in the -urba.~ occupation, pulling the educated labor out of the rural 
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occupation. The welfare criterion then is 
dG v+ Y& = v--FL, (12) 
which has a positive sign if FL, is smaller than v, but can be negative if the social 
marginal product in the rural occupation is substantially higher than the wage in 
the rural occupation and further exceeds the wage that was paid to the emigrant. 
Introduce now the emulation effect, so that the brain drain induces a rise in 
iii,” - In this case, clearly the production loss is aggravated. For, in the u.rban 
occupation, L,, is reduced by (~,,&,,/i?jJdZii,,, where qe. is the elasticity of 
demand for labor in the urban occupation. On the other hand, the labor shortage 
is increased in the rural occupation because L,, is reduced as follows: 
dL,, = -dz- L,“(l - %U) &j ala 
Therefore, the shortage of educated labor in the rural occupation increases by 
more than the size of emigration if v],, < 1. The total production loss is then 
(13) 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the employment of the urban occupation reduces, 
the shortage in the rural occupation increases. 
If our analysis accurately reflects the reality in some LDCs, then we must 
consider to be somewhat optimistic the following view of Myint (1968) on the 
effects of the brain drain of doctors from large cities in the LDCs : 
The pressure of excess demand from the advanced countries is most likely to 
affect the doctors in private practice in the bigger towns in the underdeveloped 
countries. In so far as this is true, the welfare effects are less ca.tastrophic than 
if the doctors were being taken away from the rural areas and the development 
effect is probably negligible. 
The analysis of this section shows that the effect of the brain drain could be 
significantly harmful even though the direct source of the emigrants was the 
urban population. 
5. Brain drain and the screening process 
Consider now the question as to who is likely to emigrate. Several ‘high-level’ 
emigrants are individuals who possess some special skills such as language 
F 
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ability, study and experience in the developeti countries. They are therefore 
likely to be specialists who have some special ability ‘needed’ in the recipient 
country. ’ ’ Suppose now that these kinds of characteristics or ability are also 
productive at home. In this case, we have the possibility that the brain drain 
functions as a screening device of more efficient from less efficient. labor. 
If these individuals receive: their full marginal productivity at h,ome, there is no 
problem,. Or if the fact that a person has a foreign offer for job and emigration 
results in his getting a corre,spondingly higher wage, there is no problem either. 
But does the employer know who possesses differentially higher ability? Or, if 
he kProws this, does hz or can he offer higher wages to such people? In other 
words, if a category of educated labor contains both ‘em&able and ‘non- 
emigrabl’e’ labor, and if the former is more efficient, does the price mechanism 
duly take account of the difference. ?I2 This section therefore deals with the 
possible imperfection of information in the market of educated labor and the 
consequences it has for the welfare effects of th,> brain drain. 
‘The basic Arrow (1973)-Spence (1974) framework for analyzing education as 
a screening (or, as Arrow calls it, filtering) device eliminates any productivity 
effects of, say, the human-capital variety. In our framework, however, we admit 
the productivity effect, but at the same time allow for the possibility that the 
(domesticj market cannot discriminate bet “veen the highly-gifted (and conse- 
quently ‘emigrable’) labor and the commonl.+educated (and consequently ‘non- 
emigrable’) labor. 
Now let us return to our basic model. AssLime again thal educated labor works 
only in the developed sector, but that educated labor consists of two categories: 
‘commonly-educated’ labor L, and ‘highly-:.fted’ labor L,. & is il times more 
productive than L,, the difference being of tlie labor-augmenting type, However, 
let us assume that employers cannot discriniinate between L, and L,, , so that all 
the educated labor receives the average ma@nal productivity. Therefore, 
we = ((1 -p)+pR}F,'(L,), il :a 1, (3’) 
wherep is the ratio of the highly-gifted la1 or to all the educated labor: p = 
&/Le == L,/‘(L,+L,). In other words, p I; ia.y be regardc:d as the probability 
of educated labor turning out to be highly gin ted. 
Then.. in the system of the basic model (I‘! -(4), with the Dnly modifica.9 ion that 
(3) is r’eplaced by (3’), we obtain the same cl ,lalitative properties for given values 
of F0 and E, as the basic model. The rise ill Eij, also creates the same qt’alitative 
impact LLS in the basic model. * 
l’The lab; i&ifiCatiOn prtc& which is necessary for ‘normal’ prokssional immigration 
in many crwntnes would tend to produce this outcome, of course. 
’ *In Japafi, For example, all lcc&ge graduates in a company rece. ve a most the same salary 
until severe1 years lifter the graduation. If somebody is offered a higher-paid position in a 
fore&n co1 ntry, ii. does not foIllow that the company pays him a higller wage. 
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Suppose now that the individuals who emigrate are picked up only from the 
highly-gifted category. Then, with a given number of educated labor, the 
marginal loss to the economy is 
while the emigrant before emigration was receiving the weighted acerage, 
0 = 5, = ((1 -p) + Izp}F;(L,). 
Therefore the direct loss to those who remain behind is given from our welfare 
criterion as follows: 
dG v+ d-7zZ = - u$(L,) + w, 
= (I- A)(1 -p)F;(L,) < 0, (14) 
assuming that the number of the educated labor is held constan:. 
Naturally eq. (14) indicates only the direct impact. When the marginal out- 
flow of highly-gifted labor occurs, however, the vacancy will be filled with new 
labor with the expected value of productivity equalling it?,. Moreover, from (1) 
and (4), the number of educated labor will then increase by 
dIVe = LOEO 
L,M’o +L,q$ dz, 
thus imposing on the economy the education cost kdN,. Therefore, the total 
effect (ruling out other effects such as emulation-induced wage increases) is 
given by 
dG v+ z = - AF;(L,) + 2iGii, - k &$- 
00 ee 
= (1 -(A- I)(1 -2JJ)jF3-kj iOw+oL w. 
A0 0 e e 
(1.5) 
Eq. (15) has no definite sign but it is easy to see that it ca:n quite easily be 
negative. 
It is worth noting that the direct-impact effect in eq. (14) is valid even if we 
work with a model with flexible wages in both the educated and the uneducated 
labor markets. Moreover, in an economy equipped with competitive labor market 
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and the amount of education optimally given by the government, eq. (14) will 
indicate the totaP effect of emigration in sucil an ecorlomy. For, if N, is deter- 
mined optimally, 
dG 2G 2G dN, -=- -- 
dZ 2Z N,:const + aNe dz 
2G =- 
az = (1- i)(l -&FL < 0, N,:consI 
by the envelope relationship. 
So :t8r we h.ave worked with the assumption that the emigrating labor is 
necessarily from the highly-gifted category. Suppose now instead that the 
probability of ,in emigrant being highly-gifted is q. Then the expected value of the 
direct impact on the economy is 
dG o+= = -c w -((l-q)+&I)C 
which is negative as long as q > p, As long as the screening power of brain drain 
has sorpze informational value, i.e., q > p, the impact effect is clearly negative. 
We have also assumed thus far that the ratio or the probability of highly- 
gifted labor i.5 independent cf the brain drain. Suppose, however, that the 
probability of an indiviuual turning out to be highly-gifted is related positively 
t3 some trait such as the high school grade. Then, the probabihty of turning out 
highly-gifted for the marginul student who comes into the educational system 
because of the emigration will be lower than the acerage probability for the 
educated. In this case, p is a decreasing function rf Z, and this factor gives rise to 
!ret further welfare-reducing effects. 
In conclusion, we may note the possible dynamic externality aspects involved in 
tl 2 emigration of the highly-gifted. It is poscible that such emigration affects, cia 
adverse impact on dcmestic availability of the highly-gifted ({who are not 
inspired and taught into full maturity of their talent in the absena: of the senior 
highly-gifted people), the welfare of those left behind by affecting the ratio p 
adversely. Thus, suppose that it takes one period to educate the younger 
generation for skilled labor. Suppose also that p(t) depends on the density of the 
preceding generation p(t - 1) such that 
PW = a+Bp(t- 1) [a > 0, 0 < p < 11. 
Then it is easy ?o show then if brain drain icr occurring every period, affecting 
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p(t) by 6, the stationary value of p will be reduced by #@/(I -/I).’ 3 Even a once- 
and-for-all emigration of highly-gifted labor will have a decaying but endu.ring 
effect on the future path of&). 
6. Brain drain and institutional change 
It should be clear by now that the welfare effects of the brain drain differ 
significantly depending on the institutional setting from which labor is emigrat- 
ing. if the phenomenon of overqualification exists, then the brain drain may 
work to improve the welfare, provided that we exclude the emulation effect on 
the wage level of the emigrant class of labor. On the other hand, if the domestic 
market for the labor is characterized by the internal diffusion Iprocess, the brain 
drain will harm those remaining behind, regardless of whether or not the emula- 
tion effect leads to a rise in the wage level. Finally, if emigrants are chosen from 
the highly-gifted category and are not so identified in the domestic market, then 
the brain drain could cause a welfare loss even with flexible wage rates. 
The institutional setting concerning wage levels and changes therein and 
informational structure differs from country to country. Even within a country, 
it must surely differ from occupation to occupation. Risking oversimplification, 
we might argue that overqualification is likely to occur most with social, scientists 
and (for certain countries, chiefly India) with engineers; the internal. difl’usion 
process is most serious for doctors and nurses, and imperfect information is 
pertinent to scholars and researchers. Therefore, depending ,on which LDC is 
being discussed, and which occupation is the object of attention, the analysis 0‘ 
the welfare effects of the brain drain is likely to vary; and a generalized analysis 
could well be misleading. Our analysis should be taken as an attempt to under- 
line the importance of setting out the nature of institutional rigidities or imperfect 
information in the labor prior to analyzing the welfare effects of such emigration. 
Note finally that our analysis in this paper has proceeded almost exclusively 
on the assumption that the institutional distortions in the domestic economy of 
the LDC of emigration are exogenous to the emigration process. The only 
exception made was for the Bhagwati-Hamada emulation effect: emigration 
from a class of skilled labor would raise the (sticky) wage of that labor, thus 
accentuating the sticky-wage distortion in the labor market. 
But we can, and indeed must, ask the question whether the emigration 
process can be expected to influence, and if so in what direction, each of the 
market imperfections tha.t we have analyzed in this paper. The analysis of the 
emulation effect in Bhagwati-Hamada (1974), and in the present paper, demon- 
strates the significance of modelling this kind of linkage into one’s theoretical 
framework. But this can also be seen from at least two other areas of inter- 
13Even without considering the above-mentioned mechanism of reducing p, p will be 
immediately reduced by the emigration of highly-gifted because it takes time to replenish 
highly-gifted labor in the situation considered here. 
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national economic analysis. Thus, in tariff theory, it is well known that while a 
domesti: monopoly is distortionary, it does not compromise the case for free 
trade since the introduction of free trade itself can be regarded as destroying the 
monopcly : the free trade policy is d.istortion-destroying and hence continues to 
be optimal. To take the ot;her example, the welfare effect of foreign investment 
by MNCs (multinational corporations) may be considered in light of its effects 
on an ‘imperfect’ domestic entrepreneurship: it may inhibit and stunt its growth 
or it may encourage it to be competitive and efficient. ’ 4 
In the present context, we must eventualiy ask questions such as the following, 
distinguishing in each case between the ‘malign impact’ and the ‘benign impact’ 
hypotheses: 
(1) Will the brain drain accentuate a domestic distortion such as a sticky wage 
(that exceeds the shadow wage as in Bhagwati-Hamada or falls below it as wi;.h 
monopsonistic pricing of a skill such as medicine under a nationalized health 
service) or will it promote increased flexibility in wage-setting in the country of 
emigration (as implied by Johnson (1972)) ? 
(2) Will the brain drain, in. the presence of unemployment, reduce the 
possible subsidy to education or will it lead to greater demands for increasing it? 
(3) Will the screening function exercised in the brain drain process induce ;he 
domestic labor market to do better screening in the future or will it demota’ize 
it into indiscriminate escalation of the entire wage leve! regardless of differential 
productivity? 
These are all yet additional instances of the unsettled debate among develop- 
ment economists whether international integration into the world economy 
leads to development in the LDCs or to their domestic disintegration.” The 
issues raised here are not purely economic; they necessarily encompass socio- 
logical,, political, ethnic and historical facets. Complex as they therefore are, and 
almost intractable to conventional economic analysis, they are equally necessary 
to address and resolve if the analysis of the brain drain is to be complete. 
14For a discussion of these possibilities of ‘malign impact’ and ‘benign impact’ models in 
analyzing MNCs, see Bhagwati (1975). 
“This phrasing is from Sunkel; see, for example,his long essay(1973) on import substitulioq. 
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